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1. Introduction
For a driver, some real-time information (e.g. traffic condition along the road and the
availability of parking spaces at certain areas) on his way to his destination may be useful.
Nowadays, drivers could mainly rely on radio broadcasting. However, the traffic news on
radio may not mention anything about the area you are driving into. A more effective way
for providing this real-time information would be desirable.
In recent years, a special kind of ad hoc network called Vehicular Ad hoc NETwork (VANET)
becomes increasingly popular. It has also become one of the critical components of an
Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS). In a typical VANET, each vehicle is assumed to
have an on-board unit (OBU) and there are road-side units (RSU) installed along the
roads. A trusted authority (TA) and maybe some other application servers are installed
in the backend. The OBUs and RSUs communicate using the Dedicated Short Range
Communications (DSRC) protocol [1] over the wireless channel while the RSUs, TA, and
the application servers communicate using a secure fixed network (e.g. the Internet). The
basic application of a VANET is to allow arbitrary vehicles to broadcast safety messages (e.g.
about vehicle speed, turning direction, road condition, traffic accident information) to other
nearby vehicles (denoted as vehicle-vehicle or V2V communications) and to RSU (denoted as
vehicle-infrastructure or V2I communications) regularly such that other vehicles may adjust
their travelling routes and RSUs may inform the traffic control center to adjust traffic lights
for avoiding possible traffic congestion. As such, a VANET can also be interpreted as a
sensor network because the traffic control center or some other central servers can collect lots
of useful information about road conditions from vehicles. It is natural to investigate how
to utilize the collected real-time road conditions to provide useful applications. It is natural
to consider whether VANET can provide an effective platform for drivers to utilize real-time
information collected in RSUs.
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In this chapter, we first highlight the most significant security and privacy challenges
in VANET protocol design. We then discuss how one should design security protocols
for VANETs. For example, we analyze in details the advantages and disadvantages of
hardware-based and software-based solutions. Next we propose a VANET-based general
information gathering scheme. A driver can issue a query (e.g. road conditions along
the roads to his destination) to a nearby RSU, our scheme can then automatically collect
the required information from the appropriate RSUs. The gathering process is done in a
real-time and distributed manner. Note that the approach of using a centralized server that
stores all information collected from RSUs may not work as the information may be changed
frequently in a real-time manner and since the VANET is huge, the server will most likely
become the bottleneck.
Like other existing VANET applications, there are basic security requirements to be satisfied
by such a protocol. They include sender authentication (to ensure that the sender is a valid
subscriber), conditional identity privacy preserving (to ensure that a driver’s travelling route
cannot be traced by any third party except the trusted authority). And there are additional
security and privacy requirements to make it more practical. Conditional identity privacy
preserving implies that a trusted authority is able to reveal the real identity of a vehicle. If the
information gathering scheme is not properly designed, a driver’s real identity and query
(the information required) can be linked up and analyzed. This is not preferable because
we want to ensure that no one in this world (including trusted authority) knows what a
driver is querying for. This leads to our privacy preserving problem. Besides, a driver may
not want vehicles nearby to know his query by eavesdropping his message. Also when the
system sends the result back to him/her, we do not want non-subscribers nearby to enjoy free
information gathering service in case it is a paid service. We regard this as a confidentiality
problem. Finally, since our information gathering scheme involves the information provided
by more than one RSU and RSUs are left unattended at roadsides most of the time, proper
and efficient authentication of this information becomes critical. Our scheme addresses this
authentication problem as well.
We provide a security analysis and a simulation study to evaluate our scheme. In our
simulation, we make use of the maps of New York (city road system) and California
(countryside highway system) downloaded from the TIGER database. We find that the
processing time is at most 1.6 % and 3.7 %, respectively, of the duration that the vehicle
stays in the querying RSU’s range in the two cities. Thus there must be sufficient time for
the vehicle to finish its query and to verify the returning information.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Challenges of security protocols for VANETs
are discussed in Section 2. Hardware and software approaches are then explained and
compared in Section 3. The systemmodel and the problem statement are described in Section
4. Some preliminaries on bilinear map are given in Section 5. Our schemes are presented in
Section 6. The analysis and evalution of our schemes are given in Sections 7 and 8. Related
work is reviewed in Section 9. Finally, Section 10 concludes the chapter.
2. Challenges of security protocols for VANETs
General security vulnerabilities and challenges for VANETs have been discussed in works like
[2] and [3]. On the other hand, we focus on the challenges for designing security protocols
in VANETs.
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1. Dynamic, linear and real-time topology
Moving vehicles are major components of VANETs. They are moving at high speed most
of the time and this makes a VANET topology change rapidly and subject to frequent
fragmentation. A vehicle which connects part of the VANET at a certain moment may
no longer act as a connector in the next moment. Also, unlike MANET, nodes move
in random direction, VANET vehicles move in a constrained manner. A vehicle must
move along roads and change its direction only at junctions. Vehicles on a road tend
to alight in a straight line. Security protocols for VANETs should not assume any fixed
node infrastructure such as trees [4] [5]. Instead, dynamic topology should be properly
handled. Furthermore, a VANET topology could be affected by drivers’ reaction to
messages. For example, a driver may change its route after receiving a message about
congestion from another vehicle. Therefore, all tasks including those for security purpose
should be performed in real-time. Centralized pre-processing is not possible.
2. Large scale and density varying network
A VANET usually covers the whole region or even the whole city and thus the total
number of VANET nodes can be very huge. This means that a centralized security
protocol such as [6] may not be a good choice. Instead, operations have to be done in a
decentralized and distributed manner. On the other hand, a VANET usually has different
network density in different regions. For example, at where there is a traffic jam, the
network becomes very dense. On the contrary, in suburban area, the network becomes
very sparse. This implies when designing security protocols for VANETs, we cannot have
the assumption of low or high network density. Instead, a good protocol should be able
to handle both situations.
3. Transmission and computation efficiency
One of the initial design goals of VANETs is the sharing of critical information (e.g. to
inform vehicles about danger ahead of a road) among vehicles. Thus most messages in
VANETs are of real-time importance. Therefore, security operations should cause as low
overhead to the network as possible. In recent years, researchers start adopting elliptic
curve cryptography (ECC) approach [7] to reduce key and ciphertext sizes. Also some
other researchers are trying to reduce the computation overhead induced by security
operations. For example, authors in [8] and [9] propose an efficient batch signature
verification technique.
4. Conditional identity privacy perserving
Normally, a driver may not want others to know his real identity and then trace his route
or driving habit. If this cannot be satisfied, he may not subscribe to any new service
including VANET at all. Thus the real identity of any vehicle should be kept anonymous
from others and a third party should not be able to reveal a vehiclea˛e˛s real identity by
analyzing multiple messages sent by it. RSUs are just installed along the roadside and
are more vulnerable to attack. In the extreme case, even if all RSUs collude, we want to
make sure that the relationship between the real identity of a vehicle and the messages it
sent cannot be revealed.
However, since vehicles are fast moving objects, injuries or even death are usually caused
when accidents take place. If an accident is caused by a VANET message, a trusted
party such as the police force may need to find out the message sender so as to avoid
repeated occurrence of similar accidents. Thus while preserving a vehiclea˛e˛s privacy, its
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real identity should be able to be traced by a trusted party when necessary. Thus we call
the identity privacy preserving here conditional.
5. Small network diameter
Because of the dynamic nature of VANETs, the network diameter, which is defined as
the number of hops between the furthest endpoints of the network, can be very small.
The network route between two vehicles may be disconnected easily due to moving
out-of-range or having obstacle blocking. Thus those secure routing protocols originally
designed for fixed Internet or MANETs cannot be directly adopted into VANETs. New
protocols such as ’carry and forward’ [10] have to be adopted to fit this specific property.
Security issues induced by this kind of forwarding strategy are still open problems.
6. Multiple levels of security
Different kinds of messages can exist in a nowadays VANET. As mentioned earlier, most
messages are critical and are about conditions on the road. However, there can be others
such as advertisements [11]. Thus a good security protocol should provide multiple
security levels such as what is proposed by [12]. A critical message should have better
protection than an advertisement message.
7. Energy efficiency considerations
Unlike mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) and wireless sensor networks (WSNs) where
nodes are assumed to run on self batteries, energy is no longer a challenge in VANETs. It
is because OBUs are continuously charged by car batteries while RSUs are continuously
charged by fixed power cables. Thus researchers’ attentions should be shifted back to
security problems themselves rather than paid to energy efficiency directions.
3. Hareware and software approaches
Recent security works for VANETs go for a certificate-less direction (i.e. a sender does not
need to send its certificate to the receiver for verification). However by nature, a vehicle’s
signature must contain a secret that is known by the receiver to facilitate the validation.
To accomplish this, recent works focus on two major directions - hardware-based and
software-based. In this section, we first explain how hardware-based and software-based
solutions work respectively. Then we briefly discuss the advantages and disadvantages of
each approach.
Hardware-based solutions usually rely on a tamper-proof device installed on a vehicle [3] [8].
It contains the secret we mentioned earlier and runs on its own battery and own clock. Thus
an outsider cannot block its functions by cutting its power supply or by inputting wrong
signals. Besides storing secrets, it is also in charge of all security operations including digital
signature, encryption and decryption. Further, the device is accessible only by authorized
personnel. A driver has to input a password before the device can function properly. A
recent example of hardware-based solutions is [8]. Here the tamper-proof device installed
on a vehicle has an accessing password preloaded. This password is assigned by a TA and
is firmed burned onto the hardware when the device is first registered. Whenever a driver
starts the vehicle, he/she has to input into the device the same accessing password in order
to enable it for further operations. This is how the authentication of driver by the device is
done. Besides the accessing password, the tamper-proof device also stores all system public
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parameters together with the master keys s1 and s2 of the TA. These master keys are assumed
to be known by only vehicles and the TA but not RSUs. They are used to form the signing
keys for constructing signatures. TA’s master keys also facilitates RSUs to verify vehicles’
signatures even though they do not have any knowledge about the master keys. (It is based
on pairing operations and interested readers please refer to [8] for details.) Note that the
master keys can only be used for security operations inside the tamper-proof device. No
outsiders, including the driver, know about their values.
Software-based solutions, on the contrary, do not rely on any tamper-proof device. What a
vehicle has is an ordinary computer device. In other words, no secret or parameter can be
preloaded securely onto a vehicle. However, it still requires them for security operations like
digital signatures. Software-based solutions obtain these information through a secure initial
handshaking. A recent software-based solution is presented in [9]. A conventional public key
infrastructure is assumed to exist for initial secure message exchange. Whenever a driver
starts the vehicle, he/she has to input into the computer device an accessing password.
This password is pre-assigned by the TA and is assumed to be given to the driver earlier
(e.g. via paper documents during car first registration). The password input by the driver
is then encrypted using the TA’s conventional public key which is assumed to be known
by everyone. The TA decrypts the password using its conventional private key and checks
whether it matches with its records. If yes, it encrypts its master keys using the vehicle’s
conventional public key. Upon receiving the encrypted message, the vehicle can obtain those
master keys by decrypting the encrypted block using its conventional private key. A vehicle’s
conventional public and private key pairs are also assumed to be assigned by the TA at earlier
stage (e.g. during car first registration). Thus the computer device can perform security
operations as what a tamper-proof device does. Based on the above brief descriptions, we
can see that both hardware-based and software-based solutions can resolve the challenges
we mentioned in Section 2:
1. They do not have any assumptions on the network nature and so they can fit the dynamic,
linear, density-varying and small-diameter VANET topology well.
2. Except initial handshaking, all cryptographic operations are done in real-time and so they
are suitable for real-time-changing VANET environments.
3. Both of them achieve transmission and computation efficiency. First, they adopt ECC
which possess the property of short key. Second, efficient signature batch verification
routines were proposed (please refer to [8] and [9] for details). Third, unlike traditional
public key infrastructure, a vehicle does not need to send its certificate to others for
signature verification purpose. Finally, unlike mobile phone network which is mainly for
unicast, Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) [1], which are short to medium
range wireless communications channels specifically designed for automative use, can
facilitate efficient broadcast.
4. A vehicle only attaches a pseudo identity in its messages. Its real identity can only
be traced by TA using a tracing routine (please refer to [8] and [9] for details). Thus
conditional identity privacy can be preserved.
5. Regarding multiple levels of security, there is already a representative work [12]. Thus,
the extension is not difficult and is practical actually.
Next let us compare the two approaches from a number of aspects.
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1. Authentications of drivers
For hardware-based solutions, to authenticate a driver, a tamper-proof device only needs
to check the accessing password input by the driver locally. If it does not match the
burned one, it simply disables all its functions. However, for software-based solutions,
the ordinary computer device does not know whether the accessing password input by
the driver is correct or not because it has no secret pre-stored. Hence, it needs to securely
transmit it via network to the TA for further verification.
2. System parameters preloading
For hardware-based solutions, the system-wide TAa˛e˛s master keys are preloaded into a
tamper-proof device. Thus, the TA does not need to send them to the device anymore
after an initial hardware burning. However, for software-based solutions, no secret or
parameter is stored in the ordinary computer device. Thus every time a driver starts
the vehicle and after accessing password checking, the TA has to send them again to the
device. Extra transmission overhead is needed in each session.
3. Replication of device contents
One basic assumption of tamper-proof device or smart card technology is that the contents
inside the device or smart card cannot be improperly extracted or replicated easily. Thus
secrets and parameters stored on them can be said to be fully protected. However, the case
is not the same for ordinary computer device in software-based solutions. As everyone
knows, the contents of a hard-disk can be cloned or replicated easily. This is why in the
software-based solutions mentioned earlier, system secrets cannot be stored in a computer
device. Instead they have to be transmitted from the TA every time it starts up.
4. Updates of system parameters
For hardware-based solutions, the system-wide TAa˛e˛s master keys and other public
parameters cannot be updated easily. Once an update is needed, a driver has to physically
bring the device to the TA for an update. However, for software-based solutions, all secrets
and public parameters are transmitted from the TA in real time when the vehicle starts
up. Thus updates can be easily done. All the TA needs to do is to send the new set of
secrets and parameters to the device.
5. Setting of new secrets after compromise
For hardware-based solutions, the same set of system-wide TAa˛e˛s master keys and public
parameters are preloaded into all tamper-proof devices. Once one of the devices is
cracked by an attacker, the whole VANET system will be compromised unless a physical
hardware update by the TA is done. However, software-based solutions do not have this
problem. When one of the devices is found to be cracked, the TA can invoke an update
of master keys and parameters by simple and secure network transmissions.
6. Modification of protocols
For hardware-based solutions, all security operations are carried out by the processor of
a tamper-proof device. Thus the same set of security operations are preloaded into all
devices. If, in the mean time, the TA wants to introduce a new security operation (e.g.
to enhance the security level of the VANET system), it needs to ask all drivers to bring
the devices to it for a hardware update. However, software-based solutions do not have
this problem. When the TA wants to introduce a new security operation, it only needs to
enable all computer devices to securely download a new software (like how we update
our computer operating systems nowadays).
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Features Hardware-based Software-based
Authentications of drivers Local tamper-proof device only Transmission to TA needed
System-wide secrets and Yes No
public parameters preloaded
Replication of device contents Very difficult Relatively easier
Updates of system-wide Physical hardware update at TA Simple secure download
secrets and public parameters
Setting of new secrets after Physical hardware update at TA Simple secure download
compromise
Modification of protocols Physical hardware update at TA Simple secure download
Complexity of security Need to be simple Relatively more complicated
operations
Table 1. Hareware-based vs. Software-based Solutions
7. Complexity of security operations
For hardware-based solutions, all security operations are carried out by the processor of a
tamper-proof device. Unluckily, the computation power of the processor is quite limited.
Up to our knowledge, not all smart cards in the market today are powerful enough to
perform pairing operations. Thus, security operations adopted have to be as simple as
possible. However, software-based solutions do not have this limitation. Even the poorest
CPU today can handle complicated operations like pairing in reasonable time.
We summarize the comparisons between hardware-based, hybrid and software-based
solutions in Table 1. We can see that the items are around efficiency, flexibility and security.
In short, recall that a VANET is of large scale, hardware-based solutions are more efficient
than software-based ones since they can reduce the transmission overhead between devices
and TA during initial handshaking. However, there may still be problems when updating of
system parameters, secrets or cryptographic protocols is required since if all drivers go to the
TA for parameters, hardware or software updates, a bottleneck will appear. Our proposed
scheme is hardware-based but we also provide suggestions about how to update system
parameters, secrets or cryptographic protocols efficiently.
4. System model and assumptions
Besides the assumptions made in other VANET applications such as TA being trusted and
real identity of any vehicle being known by TA and itself but not by others, we further assume
the followings:
1) There exists a conventional identity-based public key infrastructure (PKI). The public key
of the TA is the same as its real identity TRID and is known by everyone. Also any RSU Ri
broadcasts its public key which is the same as its real identity RRIDi with hello messages
periodically to vehicles that are travelling within the RSU-Vehicle Communications (RVC)
range of it. The validity of RRIDi can be ensured using a certificate issued by the TA.
2) Each RSU has a local database storing road information in its range (e.g. GPS locations of
boundaries, names of buildings and streets, etc.). This facilitates an RSU to answer queries
that are about fixed facilities in its range.
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3) Each vehicle has a tamper-proof device and a conventional computer device with GPS
receiver. The tamper-proof device is responsible for generating pseudo identities and
signatures on messages (details will be given later in the next section) and is assumed to
have its own clock for generating correct time stamps and be able to run on its own battery
[3]. The conventional computer device is responsible for all other calculations and can receive
GPS signals.
4) We assume that there is a reasonably large number of information gathering queries issued
to RSUs. Otherwise, if there is only one query, the sender can be linked up with the query
easily.
5. Preliminaries
Our security scheme is pairing-based and defined on two cyclic groups with a mapping called
bilinear map [7]. In this section, we briefly introduce what a bilinear map is.
Let G be a cyclic additive group and GT be a cyclic multiplicative group. Both groups G and
GT have the same prime order q. The mapping eˆ : G ×G → GT is called a bilinear map if it
satisfies the following properties:
1. Bilinear: ∀P,Q, R ∈ G and ∀a, b ∈ Z, eˆ(Q, P + R) = eˆ(P + R,Q) = eˆ(P,Q) · eˆ(R,Q). Also
eˆ(aP, bP) = eˆ(P, bP)a = eˆ(aP, P)b = eˆ(P, P)ab.
2. Non-degenerate: There exists P,Q ∈ G such that eˆ(P,Q) 6= 1GT .
3. Computable: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute eˆ(P,Q) for any P,Q ∈ G.
The bilinear map eˆ can be constructed using pairings on elliptic curves. Each operation for
computing eˆ(P,Q) is referred as a pairing operation. Pairing operation is the most expensive
operation in this kind of cryptographic schemes. The fewer the number of pairing operations,
the more efficient the scheme is. The groups G and GT are called bilinear groups. The
security of our schemes relies on the fact that the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) on
bilinear groups is computationally hard, i.e., given the point Q = aP, there exists no efficient
algorithm to obtain a by given P and Q. The implication is that we can transfer Q in an
open wireless channel without worrying that a (usually some secret) can be known by any
attackers.
6. Our scheme
This section presents our Privacy-preserving Information Gathering scheme. We first
summarize our scheme into some basic steps (see Figure 1):
1) TA sets up parameters and generates anonymous credentials.
2) Vehicle Vi requests for a credential from RSU Rj.
3) RSU Rj verifies Vi’s identity and sends it a credential.
4) After a random delay or after travelling for a random distance, Vi sends out its request to
RSU Rk.
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Figure 1. Basic Steps in Our Scheme
5) RSU Rk forwards the request to its neighbors. This process repeats until the request
reaches the RSU covering the furthest point of interest with respect to Vi’s current location.
6) RSU Rd constructs the information reply message and sends it along the reverse path.
Each hop whose range overlaps with the region of interest attaches the corresponding hop
information (with signature).
7) RSU Rk forwards the reply message to Vi which then verifies the messages from all RSUs
along the route in a batch.
8) Based on Vi’s pseudo identity received from RSU Rj, TA reveals Vi’s real identity for billing
purpose.
Next we explain our scheme in details. The notations used in this chapter are summarized
in Table 2.
6.1. Setup
During system startup, the following steps will be carried out by TA:
1. It chooses groups G (with g as the generator) and GT that satisfy bilinear map properties.
2. It randomly picks s ∈ Zq as the master secret (preloaded into all vehicles’ tamper-proof
devices).
3. It computes gpub = g
s as a public parameter. Note that given gpub = g
s, there exists no
efficient algorithm to obtain s based on the fact that the discrete logarithm problem (DLP)
on bilinear groups is computationally hard.
4. It assigns itself a secret key TSK and an identity TRID = gTSK which is assumed to be
known by everyone in the system.
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Symbol Meaning
G and GT Bilinear groups
g Generator of G
s System master secret
gpub = g
s Public parameter
TRID Identity of TA
TSK Secret key of TA s.t. TRID = gTSK
TSIGTSK(M) TA’s signature on message M using TSK
Ri RSU number i
RLi Location of RSU Ri
RCi Certificate of RSU Ri
RRIDi Identity of RSU Ri
RSKi Secret key of RSU Ri s.t. RRIDi = g
RSKi
CT Anonymous credential for period T
Vi Vehicle number i
VCi Certificate of vehicle Vi
CPKi Conventional public key of vehicle Vi
CSKi Conventional private key of vehicle Vi
VRIDi Real identity of vehicle Vi
VPWDi Hardware activation password on Vi
VPIDi Pseudo identity of vehicle Vi
VSKi Signing key of vehicle Vi
S_ENCx(M) Symmetrical encryption of M using key x
AS_ENCx(M) Asymmetrical encryption of M using key x
SIGx(M) Signature on message M using key x
H(M) MapToPoint hash value [13] on message M
h(M) One-way hash value of message M
Table 2. Notations used in this chapter
5. It assigns each RSU Ri locating at RLi a secret key RSKi, an identity RRIDi = g
RSKi
and generates its certificate as RCi =< RRIDi, RLi, TSIGTSK(RRIDi||RLi) > where
TSIGTSK(RRIDi||RLi) = H(RRIDi||RLi)
TSK is TA’s signature on the concatenation of
RRIDi and RLi. Here H(.) is a MapToPoint hash function.
6. It assigns each vehicle Vi a real identity VRIDi = g
x where x is a random number and can
be thrown away after generating VRIDi, and the hardware activation password VPWDi.
TA preloads them into the tamper-proof device of Vi.
7. It assigns each vehicle Vi a pair of conventional public key VCPKi and private key VCSKi
under any public key infrastructure. VCSKi is preloaded into the tamper-proof device of
Vi while VCPKi is stored into TA’s local database. This conventional public and private
keys are for updating the master secret s when there is a need (e.g. when any vehicle is
proved to be compromised and the master secret is leaked to attackers). During such an
update, TA can encrypt and send the new master secret to each uncompromised vehicle
Vi using the corresponding VCPKi. In this way, only the uncompromised vehicles can
decrypt and obtain the new master secret.
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Throughout this chapter, let us use the notations AS_ENCx(M) and S_ENCx(M) to denote
encrypting message M using the key x based on any asymmetric and symmetric encryption
algorithms, respectively.
6.2. Generation of anonymous credentials by TA
In our scheme, a credential will expire after a predefined period of time. Thus even if
a subscriber leaks its credential to a non-subscriber or even to an attacker, the impact to
the system is limited. Assume that the current time is T. TA computes the credential for
the current period as CT =< CRD, T, TSIGTSK(CRD||T) >, where TSIGTSK(CRD||T) =
H(CRD||T)TSK , and sends it to all RSUs securely via a fixed infrastructure. We can see that
the credential carries no information about any user and that is why we call it "anonymous".
6.3. Activation of tamper-proof device on vehicle Vi
When the vehicle Vi starts, the driver enters the real identity VRIDi and password VPWDi
(assigned by TA in Section 6.1) into the tamper-proof device to activate it. Here only simple
hardware checking is involved. The tamper-proof device continues with its pseudo identity
generation and message signing tasks only if both the real identity and the password are
correct. That means Vi cannot use the service if it is being stolen.
6.4. Vehicle Vi requesting for anonymous credential at RSU Rj
To request for an anonymous credential, Vi’s tamper-proof device performs the following
steps:
1. It generates a pseudo identity VPIDi = (VPIDi1,VPIDi2) = (g
r,VRIDi ⊕ H(g
r
pub))
where r is a per-session random nonce.
2. It composes the credential request message Mi = {CRD_REQ}.
3. It picks a random number rand and encrypts it using Rj’s identity as AS_ENCRRIDj (rand).
This random number becomes a shared secret between itself and RSU Rj. Rj will use it
to encrypt the credential at a later stage.
4. It generates the signing key VSKi = (VSKi1,VSKi2) = (VPID
s
i1, HP
s
i ) where HPi =
H(VPIDi1||VPIDi2).
5. It generates the signature σi on Mi and Ti (Ti is the current timestamp given by the
tamper-proof device) as VSKi1 ×VSK
h(Mi ||Ti)
i2 where h(.) is a one-way hash function such
as SHA-1.
6. It sends < AS_ENCRRIDj (rand),VPIDi, Mi, Ti, σi > to RSU Rj nearby.
The RSU Rj then performs the following steps:
1. It checks the timestamps in the messages. For any message, if the difference between the
attached timestamp and the current time is larger than a threshold (which is a system
parameter), the message is ignored. This can help reduce the impact of reply attack.
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2. It verifies Vi’s signature by checking whether eˆ(σi, g) = eˆ(VPIDi1 × HP
h(Mi ||Ti)
i , gpub).
Proof of correctness:
L.H.S.
= eˆ(σi, g)
= eˆ(VSKi1 × VSK
h(Mi ||Ti)
i2 , g)
= eˆ(VPIDsi1 × HP
sh(Mi ||Ti)
i , g)
= eˆ(VPIDi1 × HP
h(Mi ||Ti)
i , g
s)
= eˆ(VPIDi1 × HP
h(Mi ||Ti)
i , gpub)
= R.H.S. 
3. If it receives requests from more than one vehicle at the same time (say request messages
M f irst, ..., Mlast, signatures σf irst, ..., σlast from vehicles Vf irst, ..., Vlast respectively),
it verifies them in a batch by checking whether eˆ(∏lasti= f irst σi, g) = eˆ(∏
last
i= f irst VPIDi1 ×
HP
h(Mi ||Ti)
i , gpub).
Proof of correctness:
L.H.S.
= eˆ(∏lasti= f irst σi, g)
= eˆ(∏lasti= f irst VSKi1 × VSK
h(Mi ||Ti)
i2 , g)
= eˆ(∏lasti= f irst VPID
s
i1 × HP
sh(Mi ||Ti)
i , g)
= eˆ(∏lasti= f irst VPIDi1 × HP
h(Mi ||Ti)
i , g
s)
= eˆ(∏lasti= f irst VPIDi1 × HP
h(Mi ||Ti)
i , gpub)
= R.H.S. 
4. For each vehicle whose signature is valid, Rj encrypts the anonymous credential for the
current period CT using rand and sends S_ENCrand(CT) back to it.
6.5. Vehicle Vi requesting for information at RSU Rk
Note that if Vi obtains the credential CT from RSU Rj and if it sends out its query to Rj
immediately, its real identity and its query can always be linked up once Rj colludes with
TA. Thus we propose two approaches to avoid this from happening:
1. Vi sends out its query to Rj only after a random delay. This is because under normal
situation, there will be credential requests from other vehicles during that random period
and as a result Rj cannot link up which query belongs to which credential request.
2. Vi sends out its query at another RSU (say Rk 6= Rj) after travelling for a random distance.
Since Rk does not know Vi’s credential request (thus pseudo identity), even if it colludes
with TA, it cannot link up Vi’s real identity and its query.
Now assume that Vi sends its query to RSU Rk. Vi performs the following:
1. It composes the request message Mi = {SREQ, LOCi, Interesti} where LOCi represents
the current location of Vi and Interesti contains a set of points of interest (in GPS
coordinates) and description of information required (e.g. average vehicle speed,
congestion status).
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2. It picks two random numbers rand and sn. rand is for Rk to encrypt the result at a later
stage and sn is used as a session number.
3. It sends < AS_ENCRRIDk (rand, sn,CT , Mi) > to Rk and stores rand and sn locally.
Rk then performs the following steps:
1. It decrypts the message using its private key.
2. It ensures the credential used CT is not outdated (e.g. the timestamp should be within a
pre-defined number of periods before the current time).
3. It verifies TA’s signature on CT by checking whether eˆ(TSIGTSK(CRD||T), g) =
eˆ(H(CRD||T), TRID).
Proof of correctness:
L.H.S.
= eˆ(TSIGTSK(CRD||T), g)
= eˆ(H(CRD||T)TSK , g)
= eˆ(H(CRD||T), gTSK)
= eˆ(H(CRD||T), TRID)
= R.H.S. 
4. It the signature is valid, it proceeds to the information gathering process.
5. It stores rand and sn locally for later usage.
6.6. Request and reply propagation
RSU Rk takes up the role of initiating the information gathering process by composing the
information request message Mk = {INFO_REQ, sn, RRIDk, LOCi, Interesti}. Let FP be the
furthest point with respect to LOCi in Interesti. Rk broadcasts Mk to all neighbors which are
closer to FP than itself.
Any receiving RSU first stores sn, RRIDk and Interesti into its routing table to build up the
reverse path so that it can send any reply back to Rk later on. Let FP be the furthest point with
respect to LOCi in Interesti. It then checks whether FP is within its range. If not, it simply
re-broadcasts Mk to all neighbors which are closer to FP than itself. Otherwise, it computes
the information reply message Md = {INFO_RPY, sn, RRIDd, RLd, RCd, HopIn f od, σd} and
sends it back to its previous RSU hop. Here HopIn f od is the information that is of Vi’s
interest and σd = H(HopIn f od)
RSKd is Rd’s signature on HopIn f od.
Each RSU hop along the reverse path Rim repeats the steps done by Rd and if any point in
Interesti is within its range, it includes information and signature corresponding to its hop
(i.e. HopIn f oim and σim) into the information reply message. Otherwise, it simply forwards
the reply message to its previous RSU hop.
Upon receiving a reply, Rk encrypts it using rand and forwards it to Vi immediately.
6.7. Verification of RSUs’ hop information
Recall that vehicle Vi receives from Rk a set of identities, a set of hop information and a set of
signatures, each corresponding to an RSU along the path of propagation. To verify the hop
information provided by an RSU, its signature is verified using its identity. In turn, to verify
an RSU’s real identity, its certificate has to be verified using TA’s identity.
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Let us first talk about how the RSUs’ certificates can be verified in a batch. Without loss
of generality, assume the RSUs along the returned route have real identities RRID f irst,
..., RRIDlast, locations RL f irst, ..., RLlast and TA signatures TSIGTSK(RRID f irst||RL f irst),
..., TSIGTSK(RRIDlast||RLlast). Vehicle Vi can then verify the (last − f irst + 1)
signatures in a batch by checking whether eˆ(∏lasti= f irst TSIGTSK(RRIDi||RLi), g) =
eˆ(∏lasti= f irst H(RRIDi||RLi), TRID)
Proof of correctness:
L.H.S.
= eˆ(∏lasti= f irst TSIGTSK(RRIDi||RLi), g)
= eˆ(∏lasti= f irst H(RRIDi||RLi)
TSK , g)
= eˆ((∏lasti= f irst H(RRIDi||RLi))
TSK , g)
= eˆ(∏lasti= f irst H(RRIDi||RLi), g
TSK)
= eˆ(∏lasti= f irst H(RRIDi||RLi), TRID)
= R.H.S. 
Further assume these (last − f irst + 1) RSUs provide the hop information HopIn f o f irst, ...,
HopIn f olast together with signatures (σf irst, ..., σlast. Vehicle Vi verifies these signatures in a
batch by checking whether eˆ(∏lasti= f irst σi, g) = ∏
last
i= f irst eˆ(H(HopIn f oi), RRIDi).
Proof of correctness:
L.H.S.
= eˆ(∏lasti= f irst σi, g)
= ∏lasti= f irst eˆ(σi, g)
= ∏lasti= f irst eˆ(H(AvgSpdi||RoadCondi)
RSKi , g)
= ∏lasti= f irst eˆ(H(AvgSpdi||RoadCondi), g
RSKi )
= ∏lasti= f irst eˆ(H(AvgSpdi||RoadCondi), RRIDi)
= R.H.S. 
We can see that vehicle Vi needs to perform only 2 pairing operations to verify the certificates
of all RSUs. For the message verification, since the signatures are generated by different
RSUs, altogether (last − f irst + 2) pairing operations are needed. Note that the above
verification procedures still apply even if the returned route contains only one single hop
Rk. In that case, we can simply set f irst = last = k in the expressions.
6.8. Traceability of vehicle Vi’s real identity
With Vi’s pseudo identity VPIDi = (VPIDi1,VPIDi2) = (g
r,VRIDi ⊕ h(g
r
pub)) and the
master secret s, TA can retrieve Vi’s real identity by computing VRIDi = VPIDi2 ⊕
h(VPIDsi1).
7. Security analysis
We analyze our scheme with respect to the security and privacy requirements mentioned
earlier.
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1) Conditional identity privacy preserving: The pseudo identity of any vehicle is an
ElGamal-type ciphertext, which is secure under the chosen plaintext attacks [14]. Also the
random nonce r makes them different in different messages. To trace the real identity, one
needs to know the value of s but s is only known by all tamper-proof devices and TA. A
tamper-proof device (which can prevent unauthorized parties from modifying its logic or
reading its stored data) is not supposed to carry out such a traceability function. On the
other hand, Section 6.8 shows that TA is able to trace a vehicle’s real identity. Thus no one
except TA can trace the real identity of a particular vehicle and conditional identity privacy
is achieved.
2) Privacy preserving and unlinkability: After vehicle Vi obtains an anonymous credential, it
presents it to the same RSU after a random delay or to a different RSU for service as discussed
earlier. In any case, that RSU does not know Vi’s pseudo identity and identity verification
is based on an anonymous credential, it cannot link up Vi’s query with its identity even if it
colludes with TA. Thus unlinkability is guaranteed.
3) Confidentiality: When vehicle Vi requests for a credential from RSU Rj, it first picks a
random number rand and securely sends it to Rj. Rj in return encrypts the credential using
rand. Thus neighboring vehicles cannot illegally receive the credential by eavesdropping
messages from the air. Similarly, when vehicle Vi requests for information gathering service
from RSU Rk, it picks another random number and Rk in return encrypts the result using that
random number. Thus no other vehicles can eavesdrop the result even if they are interested
in similar information. For the query, Vi encrypts it using RSU’s identity and so it is kept
confidential from others.
4) Message authentication: TA’s signature on message M is defined as H(M)TSK . Since TSK
is only known by TA, no others can forge the signature.
Similarly, RSU Rj’s signature on message M is defined as H(M)
RSKj . Again since RSKj is
only known by Rj, no others can forge the signature.
Regarding vehicle Vi’s signature, it is composed of VSKi1 and VSKi2. VSKi1 is defined as g
rs.
Due to the difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm problem, there is no way for attackers
to obtain s and thus no one other than the tamper-proof device can compose VSKi1. VSKi2,
on the other hand, is defined as HPsi . Again, since no one other than tamper-proof devices
knows s, VSKi2 cannot be forged as well.
8. Simulation results
In this section, we evaluate our scheme in terms of processing delay using a network
simulation program. Through simulation, we show that the processing delay caused by
our cryptographic functions is minimal.
8.1. Simulation models
In our simulation, we made use of two maps downloaded from the TIGER database [15] -
one is New York and the other is California. New York represents a city road system (see Fig.
2 for the Google Map [16]) in which most roads have speed limit of 50 km/h. California, on
the other hand, represents a countryside road system (see Fig. 3 for the Google Map [16]) in
which some highways have speed limit up to 120 km/h. RSUs are randomly placed onto each
Privacy-Preserving Information Gathering Using VANET
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/53537
159
road. With the consideration of speeding behavior, we assume New York has average vehicle
speed readings from 0 km/h (road blocking situation) to 70 km/h (speeding situation) while
California has average vehicle speed readings from 0 km/h (highway blocking situation) to
140 km/h (speeding situation).
Figure 2. City Road System in New York
Figure 3. Countryside Highway System in California
The settings and parameters of our simulation are adopted from [8] and [9]. Interested
readers may refer to them for details. We fix the size of our newly-introduced components
as follows: 5 bytes for control messages like CRD_REQ, 20 bytes for each representation of
GPS location, 255 bytes for timestamp and 10 bytes for random number.
We define 16 geographical distance ranges of 1 km each. For New York, the closest source
and destination we pick are only 1 km apart while the furthest are 16 km. For California,
the closest source and destination we pick are only 5 km apart while the furthest are 80
km. For each range, we randomly pick 60 sets of sources and destinations that are within
the geographical distance range. We treat them as the current location and the furthest
point of interest of a querying vehicle respectively. We then consider the worst case that
all points between the current location and the furthest point of interest are of the driver’s
interest. The types of information we consider are average vehicle speed and general road
condition (e.g. accident, traffic jam). Without loss of generality, we assume that the vehicle
requests for a credential or sends out its query once it enters an RSU’s range (upon hearing
its beacon broadcasts). Since a vehicle can wait for a random delay or travel for a random
distance after obtaining a credential before sending out its query, we define the processing
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time as the period from when the vehicle sends out its query to when it finishes verifying
the information provided by all RSUs in the reply message. This processing time is then
normalized by dividing it by the duration that the vehicle is in the range of the RSU to which
it sends its query. The data from all the 60 sets are then averaged to obtain a data point as
shown in Figure 4 below. Note also that we represent a range using its class mark.
8.2. Simulation results
Fig. 4 shows the results for New York city. We can see that as the geographical distance
increases, the processing time increases. When the source and the destination nodes
are further away (i.e. a vehicle wants to gather information about a point of interest
which is further away), more RSU hops are involved. This not only leads to more RSU
signing operations but also more pairing operations at the vehicles in the verification phase.
Nevetheless, among all geographical distance ranges, the processing time is at most 1.6 % of
the duration that the vehicle stays in the querying RSU’s range. Thus there must be sufficient
time for the vehicle to finish its query and to verify the returning information.
Figure 4. Normalized Processing Time vs. Geographical Distance (New York)
Fig. 5 shows the results for California city. We can see again that as the geographical distance
increases, the processing time increases. When the source and the destination nodes are
further away (i.e. a vehicle wants to gather information about a point of interest which
is further away), more RSU hops are involved. This not only leads to more RSU signing
operations but also more pairing operations at the vehicles in the verification phase. Among
all geographical distance ranges, the processing time is at most 3.7 % of the duration that the
vehicle stays in the querying RSU’s range. This value is a little bit greater than that for New
York city due to larger geographical distances. Anyway, there must be sufficient time for the
vehicle to finish its query and to verify the returning information.
Figure 5. Normalized Processing Time vs. Geographical Distance (California)
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9. Related work
A similar scheme of real-time information gathering using VANET is proposed in a recent
work [17]. However, there are a number of differences between their scheme and ours. First,
their scheme is a small scale navigation scheme which covers a carpark while ours is large
scale to cover the whole city and beyond. Second, in their scheme a carpark is monitored by
three RSUs which centrally take up the roles of determining a vehicle’s location, searching
for a vacant parking space and providing navigation service to guide the vehicle to go from
the carpark entrance to the selected parking space. That is, all information are provided by
the three RSUs. In our scheme, the road system in the city is monitored by a large number
of RSUs which take up the information gathering task in a distributed manner. Third, in
terms of security functions, their scheme assumes RSUs to be fully trusted. This makes sense
since the three RSUs are installed indoor and can be monitored by security guards from
time to time. However, such an assumption is no longer valid in our outdoor setting. It is
impossible to have security guards monitoring all RSUs across the city. Thus, unlike their
scheme, authentication of RSUs becomes a vital component in ours. Fourth, our scheme
allows one’s identity and query to be delinked. This feature is only interesting for wide area
information gathering like ours. Thus, the scheme provided in [17] cannot be used to solve
the information gathering problem discussed in this chapter.
Other recent efforts related to the security issues in VANET include [8, 9, 18–21]. In [8], a
batch verification scheme was proposed for an RSU to verify a large number of signatures
at the same time using only three pairing operations. In [18], an RSU-aided inter-vehicle
communications scheme was proposed. A vehicle relies on an RSU to verify the signature of
another vehicle. In [19], group communications in VANETs are considered and a group key
update protocol was proposed. In [9], some security and privacy-enhancing communications
schemes were proposed. Of particular interest, a group communications protocol was
defined. After a simple handshaking with any RSU, a group of known vehicles can verify the
signature of each other without any further support from RSUs. A common group secret is
also developed for secure communications among group members. [20] and [21] also target
at driver privacy preservation but instead of using pseudo identities, the concept of group
signature is adopted. The signature of any vehicle can be verified by the same group key but
the actual signer can only be traced by a trusted party. Though privacy can be preserved,
group signature schemes are rather complicated and may not be practical.
10. Conclusions
In this chapter, we first highlighted the most significant security and privacy challenges
in VANET protocol design. We then discussed how one should design security protocols
for VANETs. In particular, we analyzed in details the advantages and disadvantages of
hardware-based and software-based solutions. Next we proposed an information gathering
scheme using VANETs. We utilized information collected by RSUs to provide drivers
information about a set of points of interest that is out of sight in a distributed manner.
Besides basic security features such as sender authentication and conditional identity privacy
preserving. Our scheme adopts some security primitives in a non-trivial way to provide
a number of additional security features: 1) With the idea of anonymous credential, no
one including TA can link up a vehicle’s query and its identity. 2) Queries and resulting
information are protected from eavesdroppers. 3) Information provided by RSUs are
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properly authenticated. We provided a security analysis and a simulation study to evaluate
our scheme. In our simulation, we made use of the maps of New York (city road system) and
California (countryside highway system) downloaded from the TIGER database. We found
that the processing time is at most 1.6 % and 3.7 %, respectively, of the duration that the
vehicle stays in the querying RSU’s range in the two cities. Thus there must be sufficient
time for the vehicle to finish its query and to verify the returning information.
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